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Wallenstein: Law and the Boundaries of Place and Race

LAW AND THE BOUNDARIES OF PLACE AND RACE IN I NTERRACIAL MARRIAGE:
I NTERSTATE COMITY , RACIAL I DENTITY, AND MISCEGENATION LAWS IN NORTH
CAROLINA, SOUTH CAROLINA, AND VIRGINIA, 1860S -1960S
by
Peter Wallenstein *
In North Carolina in 1869, Wesley Hairston, a black man, and Puss Williams, a white
woman, went on trial in Forsythe County for “fornication and adultery.”1 They claimed
they were married, but the judge instructed the jury that no such marriage could be
valid in North Carolina. 2 When the jury convicted both defendants, they appealed the
judge’s instruction and the jury’s verdict.3 The North Carolina Supreme Court dashed
their hopes when it declared: “The only question in this case is, whether the
intermarriage of whites and blacks is lawful.”4 A unanimous appeals court rejected the
“pretended marriage” and upheld the convictions.5
Hairston and Williams did not see their convictions as consistent with the facts.
They thought they had both contracted a marriage and found instead that they had each
committed a felony. Other couples ran into similar problems. Brought to court, some
argued that they had entered a valid marriage and, having moved into another state, they
should not be subject to the enforcement of its laws against interracial marriage.
Others, challenging the premise that they did not share one racial identity, argued that,
since they were both black or both white, the miscegenation law should not reach their
marriage.
This essay draws from case materials in three states to explore two of the main
problems in enforcing—or escaping conviction under—laws in the United States against
interracial marriage during the hundred years after the Civil War. Questions of
interstate comity and racial identity, though not both involved in every miscegenation
case, would remain issues in many such cases as long as laws against interracial
marriage remained in effect. Only in 1967, when the U.S. Supreme Court decided
Loving v. Virginia and declared such laws unconstitutional, 6 would the boundaries of
race and place no longer have any bearing on the law of marriage between a man of one
race and a woman of another.

*

Associate Professor of History, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University. B.A.
1966, Columb ia University; Ph.D. 1973, Johns Hopkins University.
1
State v. Hairston, 63 N.C. 451, 451 (1869).
2
Id.
3
Id. at 452.
4
Id.
5
Id. at 453.
6
Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
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1. A Marriage, Valid in the State Where Contracted, Must It Be Recognized
Elsewhere? The View(s) from North Carolina
What if a couple had married legally in another state and then moved to North
Carolina, where they would not have been permitted to marry? State boundaries
affected the law of interracial marriage in multiple ways. At any one time, some
states permitted interracial marriages, while others did not. If a married couple
moved from a state where they had a valid marriage into a state that banned such
marriages, did their marriage survive the move? If so, might a marriage be valid if a
couple deliberately went out of state to evade the law, married, and then returned
to their home state?
Two cases, both decided in 1877 by the North Carolina Supreme Court,
illustrate the doubtful validity of interracial marriages in view of different states’
conflicting laws. North Carolina had a constitutional provision and a statute that
banned marriages between black and white citizens, and the state’s authority to
enact such a law was not challenged in these two cases. Nonetheless, enough
uncertainty surfaced at trial that one couple was found guilty and the other
acquitted. In both cases, the losing side appealed to the state supreme court, and
that court—in each case, in an opinion written by the same judge—upheld the
lower court, though in one case with a divided voice. The question arose because
at that time South Carolina permitted interracial marriages, while North Carolina
did not.
Two citizens of North Carolina—Isaac Kennedy, a black man, and Mag
Kennedy, a white woman—went to South Carolina to get married. Immediately
after their wedding, they returned to North Carolina, where they were indicted for
fornication and adultery and tried and convicted in Mecklenburg County, just
across the state line from South Carolina.7 Speaking for a unanimous supreme
court, Justice William R. Rodman noted that their domicile, both before and after
their marriage, was North Carolina.8 Had they left with the intent to evade the
North Carolina law? Justice Rodman found the question immaterial, for they had
never established another domicile.9 Speaking of his state’s law against such
marriages, he said, “A law like this of ours would be very idle if it could be avoided
7

State v. Kennedy, 76 N.C. 251 (1877).
Id.
9
Id. at 252.
8
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by merely stepping over an imaginary line.”10 As the judge noted, “when it is
conceded as it is, that a State may” pass such a law as North Carolina’s, “the main
question is conceded.”11 How could this particular pair be anything but guilty?
Yet an exception might be permitted, as Justice Rodman decided that same
term in the case of State v. Ross.12 This case, too, concerned a black man and a
white woman who married in South Carolina and were later living in North
Carolina, in the same border county. In May 1873, Sarah Spake, a citizen of
North Carolina, went to Spartanburg, South Carolina, to marry Pink Ross, a
citizen of that state. They married that month, lived “as man and wife” in South
Carolina for three months, and then moved to Charlotte, North Carolina.13 In
Mecklenburg County, Judge David Schenck found the couple not guilty of
fornication and adultery, even though he had decided otherwise in the case of Isaac
Kennedy and Mag Kennedy. The Rosses, unlike the Kennedys, had a valid
marriage.14
The state appealed the decision, but Justice Rodman spoke for a majority of the
supreme court in upholding Judge Schenck. The appeals court understood the
central question to be “whether a marriage in South Carolina between a black man
and a white woman bona fide domiciled there and valid by the law of that State,
must be regarded as valid in this State when the parties afterwards migrate here?
We think that the decided weight of English and American authority requires us to
hold that the relation thus lawful in its inception continues to be lawful here.”15
“Our laws have no extra territorial operation,” Rodman wrote.16 When the
woman married a man from another state, she immediately acquired his domicile,
and when they moved to North Carolina, they came as citizens of that other state.17
“We are under obligations of comity to our sister States,” he said, and the
marriage remained valid when the couple moved into the state.18 “Upon this
10

Id. at 252-53.
Id. at 253.
12
76 N.C. 242 (1877).
13
Id. at 243.
14
Id.
15
Id. at 245.
16
Id. at 243.
17
Id. at 244.
18
Id. at 247.
11
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question above all others,” he concluded, “it is desirable . . . that there should not
be one law in Maine and another in Texas, but that the same law shall prevail at
least throughout the United States.”19 As for Pink Ross and Sarah Spake, their
“cohabitation,” although “unnatural and immoral,” met the standard of “lawful.”20
Justice Edwin G. Reade wrote a vigorous dissent, one that suggested that the
court’s approach in that case would hardly prevail everywhere and might not last
long in North Carolina.21 The state attorney general had argued that this interracial
marriage ought to be treated in the same way that an incestuous or polygamous
marriage would—it should be criminalized under North Carolina law.22 According
to Justice Reade, comity had its limits; it was “secondary to the public good,”23 and
“the public good is paramount.”24
North Carolina, with its clear declaration of law on the subject, had no need to
recognize a neighboring state’s laws in this respect. “If such a marriage solemnized
here between our own people is declared void, why should comity require the evil
to be imported from another State? Why is not the relation severed the instant they
set foot upon our soil?”25 Any “individuals who have formed relations which are
obnoxious to our laws can find their comfort in staying away from us.”26
Justice Reade went farther in his statement of the limits of the comity. The
Fourteenth Amendment’s privileges and immunities clause, he wrote, “does not
mean that a citizen of South Carolina removing here may bring with him his South
Carolina privileges and immunities; but that when he comes here he may have the
same privileges and immunities which our citizens have. Nothing more and nothing
less.”27 Reade rejected the majority’s position. “We give to comity all the force of
a constitutional provision when we allow it to annul a statute. Indeed we put it

19

Id. at 247.
Id. at 247.
21
Id. at 248.
22
Id. at 245.
23
Id. at 249.
24
Id. at 250.
25
Id. at 249.
26
Id. at 250.
27
Id.
20
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above the [North Carolina] Constitution itself; as I believe one of the late
amendments prohibits the intermarriage of white and colored.”28
2. South Carolina Eliminates a Legal Sanctuary
South Carolina did not long remain without a miscegenation statute of its own.
The Palmetto State had suspended its previous ban in 1868. In 1879, proponents
of a new ban complained that interracial couples from North Carolina were
choosing to live in South Carolina.29 The new miscegenation statute of 1879
provided that, for each partner in an interracial marriage, the penalty would be a
minimum fine of $500 or a minimum term of imprisonment of twelve months.30
Within the next three years, a white woman who married a black man was
sentenced in Kershaw County to twelve months in jail, and a white man who
married a black woman was convicted in Union County.31 South Carolina’s
temporary tolerance of interracial marriage, because it attracted interracial couples
from a more restrictive neighboring state, helped spur passage of a law that ended
the opportunity for residents and non-residents alike.
3. But What Race Is She Really?
In October 1881, John Crawford and Maggie Dancey went on trial for violating
South Carolina’s new law against interracial marriage. After courting in North
Carolina, they had decided to marry. The couple had heard that North Carolina
had a stringent law against their doing so but, believing that South Carolina had no
such law, they thought they had a remedy. Crawford moved back south across the
state line to his home in York County, and Dancey soon followed from her family’s
home in Mooresville, just north of Charlotte. They approached a black preacher,
Edward Lindsay, about their wishes, and he assured them that they could marry in
South Carolina. The ceremony took place, and their arrests soon followed.32

28

Id.
Byron C. Martyn, Racism in the United States: A History of Anti-Miscegenation
Legislation and Litigation 604, 626-27 (1979) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of
Southern California) (on file with author); GEORGE BROWN TINDALL, SOUTH CAROLINA
NEGROES , 1877-1900, at 296 (1952).
30
TINDALL, supra note 29, at 297 (citing 1879 S.C. Acts No. 5, § 2).
31
Id. at 297-98.
32
Intermarriage of the Races, CHARLESTON (S.C.) NEWS AND COURIER, Oct. 31, 1881, at 1.
29
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The newlyweds’ marriage did not involve the question of comity, but it definitely
involved another thorny issue, the question of racial identity. John Crawford
testified that the fair-skinned woman he had married came from a family that, back
in her hometown, was regarded as mixed-race. He had seen his wife’s
grandmother, a “bright mulatto,” he said.33 The family attended a black church,
associated only with African Americans, and despite their color, seemed to fall on
the black side of the great racial divide.34 The couple’s argument was that, even
though Maggie was of “fair complexion,” with “flaxen or light auburn hair and light
blue eyes,” she was black just the same as her “dark mulatto” husband.35 If
proved, the couple had not, after all, broken the law.
The fact that the only evidence in the case consisted of the defendants’ own
testimony left the court perplexed. Because Maggie Dancey went on trial some
distance from her family’s residence, no local witnesses could help the court with
testimony regarding the Dancey family’s racial reputation. The judge called upon a
white medical doctor, W. J. Whyte, to offer his expert testimony, but the doctor,
after a brief examination in the waning light of day, reported the woman’s identity
difficult to pin down.36 The judge held the trial over to the next morning.37 The
doctor tried again but complained that the microscope with which he examined the
woman’s hair and skin seemed inadequate to the task.38 If forced to choose, he
held to his original opinion that Maggie Dancey was a white woman, but he could
not be certain. 39
The judge put the matter in the hands of the jury. He told them that if they were
unsure, they should resolve their doubt in favor of the woman.40 After an hour’s
deliberation, the jury reported its verdict. Maggie Dancey was white, and John
Crawford was not. Both were guilty. 41

33

Id.
Id.
35
Id.
36
Id.
37
Id.
38
Id.
39
Id.
40
Id.
41
Id.
34
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The kind of question that Maggie Dancey raised could never vanish as long as
the law of marriage insisted on dividing people into two racial categories,
categories that in fact existed along a continuum. A few years after the convictions
of Crawford and Dancey, other South Carolinians demonstrated the political
problem of defining race when delegates to the state constitutional convention of
1895 considered whether to incorporate the miscegenation statute into the
fundamental law. One proposal would have classified as white only those residents
without “any” African ancestry.42 Another would have set the boundary so that
only those people with less than one-quarter African ancestry qualified as white.43
The convention settled upon a boundary at one-eighth, so that having one AfricanAmerican great-grandparent would result in classification as black.44
4. “Subject to No Evasion”: State Boundaries and the Law of Interracial Marriage
in Virginia
The case of Andrew Kinney, a black man, and Mahala Miller, a white woman,
supplied Virginia’s major precedent regarding miscegenation cases in the latenineteenth and twentieth centuries. By 1874, Kinney and Miller had lived together
long enough to have had three sons born since 1867.45 Perhaps seeking to avoid
charges of unmarried cohabitation, yet unable to find a preacher who would marry
them in Virginia, they left their home in Augusta County in November 1874 and
traveled to Washington, D.C., to get married.46
The gesture failed to protect them from prosecution. Virginia authorities
charged Kinney with “lewdly associating and cohabiting” with Miller.47 Kinney
claimed to be married to Miller, and his attorney urged the trial judge to instruct the
jury that the marriage was “valid and a bar to this prosecution.”48 Instead, the
judge instructed the jury that the marriage was “but a vain and futile attempt to
evade the laws of Virginia,” laws that banned any marriage between a white
resident and an African American.49 Convicted and fined $500—the maximum
42

TINDALL, supra note 29, at 299.
Id.
44
Id.
45
Manuscript population schedule, Census of 1880, Augusta County, Virginia.
46
Kinney v. Commonwealth, 71 Va. (30 Gratt.) 858, 859 (1878).
47
Id. at 858-59.
48
Id. at 859.
49
Id. at 860.
43
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fine under the law—Kinney appealed the decision, first to the circuit court and then
to the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals.50
The question, simply put, was: Did the defendant have a valid marriage that
gave him an effective defense against the charge he faced? Or, rather, was his
living as though he were married precisely the basis for that charge? Was he
married? Or was he guilty?
The appeals court viewed Andrew Kinney’s action as “a violation of [Virginia’s]
penal laws in this most important and vital branch of criminal jurisprudence,
affecting the moral well being and social order of this state.”51 As to whether the
law of Washington, D.C., or that of Virginia—“the lex loci contractus or the lex
domicilii”52 governed the case, Judge Joseph Christian, speaking for a unanimous
court, declared: “There can be no doubt as to the power of every country to make
laws regulating the marriage of its own subjects; to declare who may marry, how
they may marry, and what shall be the legal consequences of their marrying.”53 In
this case, the “country” was Virginia, and Kinney the “subject.”
Judge Christian reviewed the precedents, English and American. Only one,
involving a marriage that took place before the American Revolution, seemed to
support Kinney. The case of Medway v. Needham54 also involved one black
partner and one white. The couple had left Massachusetts, which banned such
marriages, and traveled to a neighboring colony, Rhode Island, which did not.
They had a wedding ceremony, and then returned to Massachusetts. There the
Massachusetts court had ruled, as Kinney now asked the Virginia court to do, that
a marriage, if valid according to “the laws of the country where it is celebrated, is
valid in every other country.”55
Speaking for the court, Judge Christian rejected this position. 56 If the ritual itself
were at issue, the marriage should be recognized as valid.57 Kinney, however,
50

Id. at 859.
Id. at 861-62.
52
Id. at 862.
53
Id. at 862.
54
16 Mass. R. 157 (1819).
55
Kinney, 71 Va. at 866.
56
Id. at 867-68.
57
Id. at 868.
51
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faced a problem not of “rites,” or “the form of the contract,” but of “essentials,”
and “the essentials of the contract depend upon . . . the law of the country . . . in
which the matrimonial residence is contemplated.”58 As the judge noted,
[t]he purity of public mo rals, the moral and physical development of both races, and the
highest advancement of our cherished southern civilization, under which two distinct races
are to work out and accomplish the destiny to which the Almighty has assigned them on this
continent—all require that they should be kept distinct and separate, and that connections
and alliances so unnatural that God and nature seem to forbid them, should be prohibited by
positive law, and be subject to no evasion.59

What “God and nature” had sundered, let no man seek to bring together. The state
of Virginia would allow no such marriage as Andrew Kinney and Mahala Miller had
contracted to persist—at least in Virginia. “If the parties desire to maintain the relations
of man and wife, they must change their domicile and go to some state or country
where the laws recognize the validity of such marriages.”60 Despite the heavy fine and
the possibility of further prosecution, the Kinneys stayed together. The 1880 census
showed the couple—now in their forties and the parents of five sons—still living
together in Augusta County.61
Having gone to the Virginia Supreme Court and generated widespread publicity, the
case jolted the Virginia General Assembly into taking further action. The new legislation
enacted in March 1878 criminalized the behavior of both parties to an interracial
marriage, and converted the penalty from the taking of property, such as Andrew
Kinnney’s $500, to the taking of liberty, with at least two years in prison though no
more than five. 62 This act, which might be termed the Andrew Kinney bill, was soon
followed by prosecutions. Expressly going beyond criminalizing interracial marriages
contracted in Virginia, the 1878 statute imposed the same new penalties on Virginians
who went outside the state to evade the law and then returned to Virginia to live. 63
One Virginia case, related directly to the 1878 law, went to federal court. Edmund
Kinney, black, had married Mary S. Hall, white, in Washington, D.C., in October 1878
and they then returned to their home in Hanover County.64 Convicted of violating the
March 1878 statute against going out of state to get married, both parties were

58

Id.
Id. at 869.
60
Id. at 870.
61
Manuscript population schedule, Census of 1880, Augusta County, Virginia.
62
Act of March 14, 1878, ch. 7, art. 8, 1878 Va. Acts 301.
63
Id. at art. 3.
64
Ex parte Kinney, 14 Fed. Cas. 602, 603 (C.C.E.D. Va., 1879).
59
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sentenced to five years at hard labor in the Virginia penitentiary.65 Kinney petitioned
U.S. District Judge Robert W. Hughes for a writ of habeas corpus.66
Judge Hughes rejected all constitutional grounds for intervention.67 What about the
Fourteenth Amendment and its talk of privileges and immunities? Nowhere, declared
Judge Hughes, did that amendment “forbid a state from abridging the privileges of its
own citizens,” a matter left to “the discretion of each state.”68
Comity would require recognition of most marriages contracted in another state, but
there were exceptions—“marriages which are polygamous, incestuous, or contrary to
public policy” and “made the subject of penal enactments.”69 Edmund Kinney was “a
citizen of Virginia amenable to her laws.”70 Though married in the District of Columbia,
he brought back with him to Virginia “no other right in regard to the marriage which he
made abroad than he took away. He cannot bring the marriage privileges of a citizen of
the District of Columbia any more than he could those of a citizen of Utah, into Virginia,
in violation of her laws.”71
Judge Hughes also rejected the relevance of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal
Protection Clause, which, he said, gave “no power to congress to interfere with the
right of a state to regulate the domestic relations of its own citizens.”72 He continued:
But even if it did require an equality of privileges, I do not see any discrimination
against either race in a provision of law forbidding any white or colored from
marrying another of the opposite color of skin. If it forbids a colored person from
marrying a white, it equally forbids a white person from marrying a colored. . . . In
the present case, the white party to the marriage is in imprisonment as well as the
colored person. I think it clear, therefore, that no provision of the fourteenth
amendment has been violated by the state of Virginia in its prosecution of this
petitioner.73

Both she and he, white and black, were in the penitentiary, Judge Hughes observed,
and thus they had received equal treatment.74 It did not matter to the judge that their
crime could just as well be seen as a consequence of their color, not their behavior.

65
66

Id.
Id. at 602-03.
67
Id. at 608.
68
Id. at 604.
69
Id. at 607.
70
Id.
71
Id.
72
Id. at 605.
73
Id.
74
Id.
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Year after year, Virginia’s penitentiary records showed the couple serving out their fiveyear sentences.75

5. “To Be a Negro Is Not a Crime”: Racial Boundaries and the Law of Interracial
Marriage in Virginia
In the 1870s and 1880s, when cases arose in Virginia regarding race, sex, and
marriage, the definition of the racial boundary could prove of central importance, as
McPherson v. Commonwealth76 demonstrates. The case arose across the James
River from Richmond in the city of Manchester, where Rowena McPherson and
George Stewart faced charges of “living in illicit intercourse” with each other.77 They
were convicted and fined despite their insistence that they were legally married.78 The
trial court determined that, while he was white, she was not, and thus their marriage
had no validity and could supply no shield in their defense. 79
A unanimous state supreme court, to the contrary, judged the facts to suggest that
McPherson was not, in fact, “a negro.”80 Her father was white (the court seems to
have taken that as meaning he was 100 percent of non-African ancestry); her maternal
grandfather was also white; and thus already she was three-fourths white. 81 To be
sure, that fraction would leave her nonwhite in the eyes of the law at that time in
Virginia. 82
The case hinged on the racial ancestry of Rowena McPherson’s maternal
grandmother; if she had been entirely African, then McPherson was nonwhite, but, if
not, then McPherson qualified as white. 83 Testimony from the family stipulated that
McPherson’s great-grandmother was “a brown skin woman,” “half-Indian.”84 Thus,
the court concluded, “less than one-fourth” of Rowena McPherson’s “blood” was
“negro blood.”85 And “[i]f it be but one drop less, she is not a negro.”86 Because she
75

1879 A NNUAL REPORT OF THE PENITENTIARY at 24, 28; 1880 A NNUAL REPORT OF THE
PENITENTIARY at 41; 1881 A NNUAL REPORT OF THE PENITENTIARY at 35; 1882 A NNUAL REPORT
OF THE PENITENTIARY at 29.
76
69 Va. (28 Gratt.) 939 (1877).
77
Id. at 939.
78
Id.
79
Id.
80
Id. at 940.
81
Id.
82
For a discussion, see Peter Wallenstein, Race, Marriage, and the Law of Freedom:
Alabama and Virginia, 1860s-1960s, 70 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 371, 395 (1994).
83
McPherson, 69 Va. at 940.
84
Id.
85
Id.
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had not married across race lines, the marriage was valid, and they were not guilty of
the offense of which they had been convicted.87
A case from Montgomery County, in western Virginia, also raised the complicated
matter of racial identity and jeopardized two Virginians’ freedom. In February 1883,
Isaac Jones obtained a license to marry Martha Ann Gray. The license listed both
parties as “black”—the form supplied only a single blank, not even suggesting that both
parties might not be of the same race. 88 Rev. Charles S. Schaeffer performed the
marriage ceremony at “the colored Baptist church near Christiansburg,” where
Schaeffer, a former Freedmen’s Bureau agent, had ministered since the 1860s.89 All
had perhaps gone well for the new couple, until they were indicted in September 1883
for “feloniously” marrying across race lines—he “a negro” and she “a white person.”90
Convicted in county court, Jones was sentenced to the penitentiary for two years
and nine months, Gray for the minimum two years.91 They appealed their convictions
to the Montgomery County circuit court, which affirmed the decision of the trial court,
and then to the state supreme court.92 They asserted that the 1878 statute violated the
U.S. Constitution, and they denied, in any case, that the statute applied to them.93 Jones
claimed to be mixed-race and not “negro,” and Gray claimed to be mixed-race and not
“white”; certainly she “was accustomed to associate and attend church with the
negroes,” and the church pastor had testified that some “colored persons attending his
church” were “whiter” than she. 94
Speaking on July 24, 1884, for a divided court, Judge Thomas T. Fauntleroy noted
that Jones stood “convicted of a crime, not only against the law of Virginia, but against
the just sensibilities of her civilization.”95 Yet the state had failed, he said, to carry the

86

Id.
Id. at 941.
88
Marriage License, Issued to Issac Jones and Martha A. Gray, 15 Feb. 1883, Montgomery
County Courthouse, Christiansburg, Va.
89
Jones v. Commonwealth, 79 Va. 213, 216-17 (1884) [hereinafter Jones I]; Ann S. Swain,
Christiansburg Institute: From Freedmen’s Bureau Enterprise to Public High School 25, 66-67
(1975) (unpublished M.A. thesis, Radford University) (on file with author).
90
Jones v. Commonwealth and Gray v. Commonwealth, 80 Va. 538, 541 (1885) [hereinafter
Jones II].
91
Id.
92
Id.
93
Id. at 540.
94
Id. at 542.
95
Jones I, 79 Va. at 216.
87
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burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.96 Thus the appeals court reversed the
couple’s convictions and remanded their case to Montgomery County for a new trial. 97
On August 3, within two weeks after the appeals court’s reversal, the county court
came to the same judgment it had the year before. The circuit court again confirmed
that decision, and “the prisoners” again appealed.98 The following June, the state
supreme court again reversed and remanded.99 Applying its reasoning from the 1877
McPherson decision, it rejected Isaac Jones’s contention that the statute did not apply
to mixed-race Virginians, but insisted nonetheless that the law applied only to people at
least one-fourth black.100 What was his racial status under the law? What, for that
matter, was hers? The court could not tell.
This time, again with Judge Drury A. Hinton dissenting, Judge Benjamin Watkins
Lacy wrote:
The charge against Isaac Jones is, that he is a negro, and that being a negro he was
married to a white woman. To be a negro is not a crime; to marry a white woman is
not a crime; but to be a negro, and being a negro, to marry a white woman is a
felony; therefore, it is essential to the crime that the accused shall be a negro—
unless he is a negro he is guilty of no offence. 101

Jones had both European and African ancestry, and the crucial question was how
much of each, but the prosecution had developed, wrote Judge Lacy, “no evidence of
his parentage, except that his mother was a yellow woman.”102
If his mother was a yellow woman with more than half of her blood derived from the white
race, and his father a white man, he is not a negro. If he is a man of mixed blood he is not a
negro, unless he has one-fourth at least of negro blood in his veins, and this must be proved
by the commonwealth as an essential part of the crime, without which it cannot exist.103

Because, Lacy wrote, “every accused person is to be presumed to be innocent until his
guilt is proved, this person must be presumed not to be a negro until he is proved to be
such.”104 Two years and three months after their wedding, the couple’s freedom to
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live together as husband and wife—and out of prison for doing so—remained in the
hands of the Virginia courts.
F. Boundaries of Race and Place in Twentieth-Century North Carolina
Sam Miller and Josephine Shook left North Carolina long enough to marry in South
Carolina. 105 Then they lived together in Catawba County, northwest of Charlotte, until
they were prosecuted in 1943 for fornication and adultery.106 Shook was white. Was
Miller? At the outset of their trial, the defendants admitted the facts of their behavior
and conceded, “if the defendant Sam Miller is of Negro blood within the prohibited
degree, that said marriage is null and void.”107
The trial turned on the question of Miller’s racial identity. To be white, he had to be
more than seven-eights white, and if the state determined him to be as much as
one-eighth black, he was black. South Carolina’s miscegenation law differed in no
material way from the North Carolina law, and comity did not enter the proceedings.
His racial identity, however, did-what it was and who would decide it.
At the trial, Dr. Fred Long testified that he had been the attending physician at
Miller’s birth.108 Long said of Miller’s mother that she was “of the whole white
blood.”109 Miller’s father, thought to be Henry Hewitt, “a Negro,”110 was the son of a
woman who was probably not “a full Negro,” said the doctor, and of a man whose
“people” probably “had some white blood in them.”111 Dr. Long guessed Miller to be
“about 3/8 Negro,” though his own testimony suggested the figure might be smaller.112
Could it be said to be less than one-eighth? Only such a fraction could legitimate the
marriage of Sam Miller and Josephine Shook.
Evidence from various witnesses for the state suggested that “the reputation of the
defendant Sam Miller in the community in which he lives is that he is of the colored
race.”113 The jury determined him to be a “Negro” under the law.114 Miller was
convicted of the charge of fornication and adultery, though his prison sentence was
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“suspended upon certain conditions,” chief among them surely that the couple not
continue to live together.115
Miller appealed. His counsel and the state agreed on the only question before the
North Carolina Supreme Court: “Was the evidence sufficient to take the case to the
jury on the question as to whether or not Sam Miller is of negro blood, within the
prohibited degree . . . .”?116 The appeals court, characterizing the evidence as “tending
to show” him to be “a Negro within the prohibited degree,”117 ruled that “the evidence
offered by the State is sufficient to sustain the verdict of the jury.”118
G. Comity, Identity, and Miscegenation Cases in Twentieth-Century Virginia
The boundaries of race and place continued to govern the law of marriage in
twentieth-century Virginia, but the state’s miscegenation laws underwent two material
changes between the 1880s and the 1930s. In one change, the minimum prison
sentence upon conviction was reduced from two years to one. 119 According to the
other, the state threw out the old one-quarter rule, first adopting a one-sixteenth
threshold in 1910 and then redefining “white” in 1924 to exclude anyone of any
traceable African ancestry.120
Shifting the boundary that separated one racial group from the other, the new law
each time reclassified significant numbers of Virginians. Virginia law had long classified
as “white” anyone of European descent who was less than one-fourth African—the
measure that shaped the outcome in Rowena McPherson’s case back in 1877. The
racial redefinitions of 1910 and 1924 each moved the boundary that determined racial
identity under the law.
Between 1910 and 1924, for example, a mixed-race person less than one-fourth
black who, before 1910, could marry only a white person—barred from marrying a
“colored person” under penalty of indictment for a felony—could now marry only
another person of color and, if marrying a white person, would be subject to
prosecution for that choice. Two mixed-race people who, under the previous
dispensation, might have legally married each other as white people (if, for example,
each were seven-eighths European and one-eighth African), might now marry each
other just as legally as nonwhite people. Finally, two mixed-race Virginians who could
not have married across the previous barrier—for example, if one had one-fourth and
the other only one-eighth African ancestry, might now legally marry each other.
115
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Genealogical tests had long had a role to play in ascertaining racial identity. Moving the
boundaries could alter the identities.
Grace Mohler married Samuel Christian Branaham in 1937 in Fincastle, Virginia.
Both were later indicted for violating the Virginia ban on interracial marriages.121 She
escaped conviction when she testified that she had not known that he was of African
descent.122 He testified that he was not, in fact, of mixed race, yet other testimony
contradicted him.123 Judge Benjamin Haden declared him to be black, not white, and
imposed a one-year prison sentence, the shortest possible under the law.124 Then he
suspended that sentence for 30 years.125 During that time, Branaham must not live with
Grace Mohler or marry any other white woman.126 As a newspaper account put it,
having been “adjudged a Negro,” Branaham was ordered “never again to live with the
pretty young white woman he married here a year ago under penalty of serving a year’s
suspended sentence.”127
In the 1950s, a Virginia case of interracial marriage presented a different question of
race at the same time it encountered the old rejection of comity, dating back to the time
of the Kinneys.128 In June 1952, Ham Say Naim, a Chinese sailor from Malaya, married
a white woman from Virginia. North Carolina, unlike Virginia, permitted marriages
between Caucasians and people of Asian ancestry. The couple had crossed into North
Carolina long enough to have a marriage ceremony and then returned to Virginia, where
they made their home in Norfolk.
Authorities brought no criminal charges, yet the Naims’ marriage made its way into
the courts anyway after the couple separated, and at that point the miscegenation laws
intruded. In September 1953, Ruby Elaine Naim filed a petition seeking annulment on
grounds of adultery, and if that effort failed, she asked that an annulment be granted on
the basis of Virginia’s ban on interracial marriages.129 The judge knew an easy case
when he saw one. Here was a marriage between a white person and a nonwhite. The
couple had gone to North Carolina in order to evade the Virginia law. Of course the
marriage was void, and he granted Mrs. Naim the annulment she sought.130
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It was Mr. Naim’s turn to go to court. On the basis of his marriage to an American
citizen, he had applied for an immigrant visa, and unless he remained married he could
not hope to be successful. 131 He challenged the local court’s decision on the grounds
that the Fourteenth Amendment overrode the Virginia statute, but a unanimous Virginia
Supreme Court of Appeals ruled against him.132 “Regulation of the marriage relation,”
insisted Justice Archibald Chapmen Buchanan, is “distinctly one of the rights guaranteed
to the States.”133 Refusing to give up, Naim appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court.
Unhappily for Naim, the nation’s high court was not yet ready to address his concerns,
and it evaded his case. 134 His marriage was over. Under Virginia law, it had never
begun.
Within a few years, Virginia courts faced another case much like the Naims’—
similar in that the interracial couple included a Caucasian and someone of Asian
ancestry.135 It was similar, too, in that Virginia’s miscegenation laws came into play in
a civil case in the context of an out-of-state marriage that failed to satisfy in-state
requirements. In the late 1950s, Rosina Calma and Cezar Calma were living in Virginia.
The Calmas—she Caucasian, he Filipino—had married in New Jersey in 1954 and had
relocated to Virginia. Virginia authorities did not arrest them, yet the public law of
interracial marriage nonetheless affected their private lives.
When Rosina Calma sought to end their marriage, Virginia courts refused to
recognize its validity, and thus she and her husband could not terminate it through
divorce in the new state of their residence. 136 When she went to the Virginia Supreme
Court, she argued that “the action of the lower court in failing to recognize the marriage
performed in New Jersey as valid in Virginia was in violation of the full faith and credit
clause of Article IV, section 1, of the Constitution of the United States.”137 She argued,
too, that the refusal to recognize her marriage violated “the rights guaranteed to her by
the equal protection and due process clauses of the fourteenth amendment.”138
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In December 1962 the Virginia Supreme Court, declaring that “we do not reach and
decide the constitutional issues” Calma had raised,139 upheld the lower court’s
disposition of the case on procedural grounds. It seems improbable that Rosina Calma
could have convinced any court in Virginia to recognize her marriage. That the issue
arose at all attested to the continuing salience of race in the law of marriage in the
South. The boundaries of race and place—and the linkages between them—alike soon
vanished from the law of marriage. But that did not come until the late 1960s, several
years after Rosina Calma’s time of futility in the Virginia courts had ended.

8. Boundaries of Race and Place Lose Their Salience
At about the time that the Calmas tried to divorce, two other residents of
Virginia, Richard Perry Loving and Mildred Delores Jeter, tried to marry. Aware
that they could not marry in their home state, they thought they could do so in the
nation’s capital. They made their journey, had their ceremony, and returned to
Caroline County. Yet, just a few weeks into their marriage, they were arrested in
the middle of the night and taken from their bedroom to the county jail.140 They
were subsequently convicted of violating Virginia’s miscegenation law, which dated
in its essentials back to 1878. Virginia law recognized the validity of their marriage
no more than it had recognized the marriages of the Kinneys eighty years before or,
much more recently, those of the Naims or the Calmas.
Mildred Jeter and Richard Loving (as the Virginia court knew them) accepted a
plea bargain, the terms of which returned them their liberty but qualified it by
requiring that they not live together in Virginia at any time during the next twentyfive years.141 They moved to Washington, D.C., resumed their identities as Mr.
and Mrs. Loving, and lived in exile for several years. In 1963, however, they had
had enough. Hearing about a new civil rights bill under consideration in Congress,
they decided to contest their fate and sought advice about their plight.142
The Civil Rights Act of 1964 said nothing whatever about interracial marriage,
but the Lovings’ lawyers—Bernard S. Cohen and Philip J. Hirschkop, both
affiliated with the American Civil Liberties Union—took their case all the way to
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the U.S. Supreme Court.143 In June 1967, that Court overturned the Lovings’
convictions and the law under which they had been prosecuted.144 Comity was not
the issue; identity was. Chief Justice Earl Warren wrote for a unanimous Court:
“The clear and central purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment was to eliminate all
official sources of invidious racial discrimination in the States.”145
The Lovings’ exile from Virginia had ended. Miscegenation laws across the
nation—among them those in North and South Carolina as well as Virginia—could
no longer be enforced.
Boundaries of race and place lost their salience under the law and from this
point forward had no more bearing on interracial couples who wished to marry
than they did on same-race couples. When the question was a matter of who
might marry whom, no longer could the question come up (as a matter of law) as to
whether two partners shared a racial identity. If race did not matter, the location of
the boundary between two racial identities could not matter. Moreover, if race did
not matter, no longer could the question of interstate comity, of “full faith and
credit,” be a consideration. As regards race and the selection of a marriage
partner, all states henceforth shared one legal environment.
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